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For 10 years of Lebanon’s 15-year civil war, my siblings and I outran bombs to reach home from school, took tests while watching sniper bullets bounce off of the building next door, heard and felt that terrifyingly loud sound of exploding bombs, spent long days and nights in rat-infested shelters and, of course, dealt with the poverty and degradation of being refugees – not to mention the repeated damage to our family’s home and grocery store, navigating off-limits streets and intersections targeted by snipers and so much more. These horrors probably make anyone who’s had a normal childhood cringe.

But here’s the bad news: What the Assad regime has done to its own people since March 2011 is far more brutal, destructive and degrading than the enormous damage it did in Lebanon. I never imagined this was possible, but it turns out there’s no limit to the regime’s inhumanity.

Syria’s numbers today are astounding: 130,000 dead (including thousands of children), more than 575,000 injured, nearly three million refugees outside Syria, nearly five million refugees displaced inside Syria; 43,000 Syrians detained and thousands suffering from starvation and lack of shelter. Then there are the latest revelations of Holocaust-like torture of thousands.

I suspect these numbers are conservative and don’t account for the destruction of entire villages and cities, and the fear, pain and hopelessness millions of Syrians are enduring every day.

“Where is our outrage? Where is our humanity? Where is the world’s conscience?” – Laura Boustani

When the uprising began, I naively thought that once the world community sees the real Assad regime, something would happen to remove it from power and Syrians would finally have a dignified life. I thought what kept Western countries from looking into the atrocities committed by the regime for the past four decades was the nearly perfected, sophisticated, lying facade of the Assad family and their apologists. Once the truth was revealed, I was sure things would change.

Residents hold the hand of a girl who was pulled from under debris after what activists said were barrel bombs dropped by Syrian government forces on Aleppo Feb. 2, 2014. (Reuters)

Fast-forward to January 2014. Thanks to traditional and social media, the world is aware of the massacres and we continue to see horrifying images of mutilated bodies, rows of dead children and so much more. My hat is off to saintly aid workers and journalists, but the rest of us do nothing to stop the madness. Where is our outrage? Where is our humanity? Where is the world’s conscience? Have we become numb to the images of the suffering, torture and mutilation?

Forget the fiasco about red lines and chemical weapons. And, forget the peace talks in Geneva, which are unlikely to be productive as long as Assad is in power. The fact of the matter now is clear as day: The world knows Assad’s brutality well and does not care.

I don’t claim to have the answers to the difficult and complicated geopolitical considerations, but I know two things must happen: The bloodshed must be stopped and the criminal regime must be removed and punished.

Damaged buildings are seen in a bombed area of Homs Jan. 27, 2014. (Reuters)

I understand the plight of the Christian minority inside Syria. And, yes, Iran, Russia, Israel and the American public make military action difficult. But when does it all stop? Teams of experts reviewing the recently released torture archives have made a direct comparison to the Holocaust. Are we waiting until the number of dead Syrians reaches six million? Has the world learned nothing from the Holocaust? Shame on every world leader and on every one of us for not doing more, for not caring more, and for not demanding the end to this holocaust.

In the words of the late journalist and author Christopher Hitchens (who was writing in 2010 about Henry Kissinger’s reference to gas chambers on the Nixon tapes), “There has to be a moral limit, and either this has to be it or we must cease pretending to ourselves that we observe one.”

So, does my beloved country have a moral limit when it comes to Syria? Does the world?

This post was originally published on Cleveland.com. It is reprinted with permission.

The views expressed in this Voices post are the authors’ own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you have an opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. And, if you would like to share your own reflections on events or issues about or relevant to the Middle East, we would be glad to consider them for publication. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for a Voices post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your personal blog.

To many people in Bahrain, President Obama’s words are undermined by the United States’ decision to send shipments of arms to the regime that represses them, as well as by the administration’s failure to bring any sanctions against senior Bahraini government officials deemed responsible for the torture of dissidents, including several deaths in custody, over the last three years. And while State Department emissaries have been on hand to monitor a series of trials widely considered unfair, they do little more than sit on the court benches witnessing injustice as it happens. Their silence is as deafening as it is telling.

The Bahraini regime’s pursuit of stability through repression obviously isn’t working, daily adding complexity and human suffering to an already volatile situation. On February 4, 2014, the King of Bahrain issued a new law (yes he can do that) clearing the way for jail terms for “any person who offends publically the Monarch of the Kingdom of Bahrain….” The actual length of the jail terms envisioned by the law is actually unclear as the English version of the law’s announcement specifies two years, the Arabic version – seven. Such flagrant stifling of dissent only adds to a general instability on the Gulf island.

” …no senior [Bahraini] government figure has been held accountable for deaths in custody, and key opposition leaders remain in jail.” – Brian Dooley, Human Rights First

The International Monetary Fund has warned that Bahrain’s “economic outlook depends on progress on the political front, and is subject to oil price risk… [and that] Bahrain’s fiscal break-even point has reached critical levels,” leaving the kingdom “vulnerable to a sustained decline in oil prices.”  Future easing of oil sanctions against Iran is likely to drive prices for the commodity down even further, putting additional strain on the kingdom’s economy

A protester holds a leaflet drawing attention to the case of an imprisoned photographer, at an anti-government rally in Budaiya, west of Bahrain's capital, Manama, December 13, 2013. The leaflet reads in part: "Silence Kills Democracy." (Reuters)

Bahrain’s government, meanwhile, insists it is committed to reform, pointing to a revised police code of conduct introduced in March of 2012, and the establishment of an ombudsman’s office. But it is hard to see what impact these reforms are having. Public protests are growing increasingly violent, leaving people dead on both sides. Bahraini authorities say over 2,300 police personnel have been injured and nine killed since the protests began in early 2011. Still today, there are nearly nightly demonstrations that often end in skirmishes between ill-trained police officers armed with tear gas and birdshot, and younger protesters hurling Molotov cocktails.

Still, no senior government figure has been held accountable for deaths in custody, and key opposition leaders remain in jail. Over the last year alone about a dozen people have been jailed for offenses as trivial as criticizing the King on Twitter.

The United States has played its hand poorly on Bahrain over the last three years, unsure of how to use the leverage of its Fifth Fleet stationed there and its overall hefty military relationship with the kingdom. It has failed to help bring about the reform and stability Bahrain desperately needs, and despite what President Obama promised, his administration has hesitated to stand squarely on the side of those reaching for their rights.

Bahraini riot police arrest an anti-government protester during clashes in Sanabis, west of Manama, December 3, 2013. (Reuters)

Since 2011, the Obama Administration has invested considerable resources into backing the King’s son, the Crown Prince, hoping he would deliver real reform. Last month, when a dialogue between the government and some in the opposition broke down, the U.S. president stepped in to kick-start the process back into life. But it remains unclear how much this process can produce without the participation of other key opposition leaders still jailed for peaceful dissent. President Obama also told the Bahraini government in 2011 that “…you can’t have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail,” but that now seems like more empty rhetoric from a distant past as such calls haven’t been heard lately from any senior U.S. administration officials.

To begin ensuring real progress in Bahrain, the United States should make clear it is done monitoring abuses from the sidelines, and that it will not continue to arm a military rooted in sectarianism. It should further make clear that real political dialogue, if that is what Bahrain’s government desires, must involve the peaceful opposition in jail. It’s time for a new day, a new era, in U.S.-Bahrain relations.

This post was authored exclusively for MEV by Human Rights First.

The views expressed in this Insight are the author’s own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you’d like to share your opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. If you are a Middle East expert or analyst associated with an established academic institution, think tank or non-governmental organization, we invite you to contribute your perspectives on events and issues about or relevant to the region. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for an Insight post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your institutional blog.

Tunisia has become an oasis of optimism in an otherwise tumultuous region. Egypt recently approved a new constitution, but its drafting was hardly a process of consensus, never mind the fact that this is the country’s second constitution in just over a year. The referendum in Egypt was marred by boycotts and violent protests, which doesn’t bode well for this constitution’s shelf life. Meanwhile, Libya hasn’t even started drafting its constitution, Yemen continues to wade through “national dialogue,” and Syria remains engulfed in civil war.

Tunisia’s constitutional process wasn’t easy either and took more than one year longer than planned. Political gridlock and assassinations threatened to derail the entire process. But after a touch and go summer, the country’s various political leaders finally compromised. The result is a solid constitution that holds the center together and leaves a majority of the population feeling relieved and satisfied.

I sat down last week in New York to discuss the new constitution with Zied Mhirsi, a global health professional and one of the founders of Tunisia Live (TL) – an independent news organization born out of the 2011 revolution. Indeed, TL has become one of the leading sources of analysis in English about developments in Tunisia. Mhirsi worked with international news correspondents analyzing the post-revolution political situation in Tunisia, and has since become involved with the Nidaa Tounes political party, led by former prime minister Beji Caid Essebsi. Nidaa Tounes is quickly becoming one of the major opposition forces to Rachid Ghannouchi’s Ennahda party.

“[W]ith the passage of this constitution, Tunisia will be starting on firmer legal ground than any other Arab country.” – Isobel Coleman, Council on Foreign Relations

Mhirsi credits much of the success of the constitution to Essebsi and Ghannouchi, “the two old wise men of Tunisia,” who put aside their differences in the name of consensus. Mhirsi remarked, “When it comes down to it, if [Essebsi and Ghannouchi] hadn’t put their weight behind the consensus, we wouldn’t be where we are today.” Mhirsi also credits civil society broadly, and the powerful quartet of labor unions and human rights organizations (the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights; Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts; General Labor Union; the National Association of Lawyers), for holding the government accountable, elevating the political debate, and resisting the temptation to slip into populism.

A member if Tunisia's assembly holds a copy of a document reading in Arabic 'Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia,' Jan. 3, 2014, in Tunis. (AP)

Mhirsi is generally positive about the constitution, and is most proud of Article 2 (which defines Tunisia as a civil state) and Article 45, which enshrines equal rights. Gender equality was one of the most contentious issues throughout the process, but women’s organizations held their ground and ensured that the new constitution granted important rights to women. “I give it an A for the Arab world,” Mhirsi said, after expressing disappointment that the constitution didn’t meet all his expectations. One of Mhirsi’s biggest disappointments was the lost opportunity to eliminate the death penalty. “It’s sad that people who faced the death penalty themselves voted for it,” he noted.

Not surprisingly, the role of religion was a significant point of contention and compromise in constitutional discussions. As a result, the constitution contains some important contradictions: it declares Islam as the state religion, but also defines Tunisia as “a civil state that is based on citizenship, the will of the people and the supremacy of law.”

Going forward, economic reform will remain a major issue in Tunisia. Mhirsi explained that since the revolution, politicians have focused on political rifts and identity disputes while neglecting to resolve many of the economic issues and inequality that brought Tunisians to the streets in 2011. Tunisia also needs to “win against terrorism in 2014″ to ensure stability, but the country’s security infrastructure is limited. The United States has provided minimal help, and Mhirsi urges the West to step up and support this fledgling democracy. In addition, Mhirsi expressed concern that although Tunisia’s adoption of a mixed presidential and parliamentary system might prevent the return of one-party rule, it could also be a source of instability.

A section view of Tunisia's National Assembly in Tunis Jan 3, 2014. (AP)

Judicial reform is another major sticking point. Under ousted president Ben Ali, the judiciary served as an extension of the ruling party, with judges directly appointed by the executive. Article 103, passed last week, declares that judges will be appointed by the president under the new constitution as well, causing some to worry that the ruling party will continue to control the judiciary. Hundreds of Tunisians, many judges among them, have held protests outside the NCA, calling for the complete independence of the judicial branch. Tunisia’s broadcast media regulatory authority has also sounded the alarm that some articles in the constitution “represent a threat to the independence and neutrality” of the media.

Ultimately, as Mhirsi noted, the future of Tunisia will depend not on the text of the constitution, but on how it is interpreted and implemented. Still, with the passage of this constitution, Tunisia will be starting on firmer legal ground than any other Arab country.

A version of this post was originally published on blogs.cfr.org.

The views expressed in this Insight are the author’s own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you’d like to share your opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. If you are a Middle East expert or analyst associated with an established academic institution, think tank or non-governmental organization, we invite you to contribute your perspectives on events and issues about or relevant to the region. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for an Insight post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your institutional blog.

The room is a brightly lit basement that’s part of a block of apartment buildings in the suburbs of Amman. Formerly used as a school for Iraqi child refugees, it today caters to Syria’s displaced children – the ‘luckier’ ones whose families have managed to find a temporary home in Jordan’s capital. On weekends, the basement is being used by a small but dedicated NGO to provide activity days for the younger children of the neighborhood.

Amir is taller than the rest of the kids in the group, and he slouches slightly as if attempting to shrink himself to the height of the other children. His young face looks older than it should. A furrowed brow, a constant worried expression. His arms hang limply, his fingers fiddling with a thread from his green t-shirt – the sleeves of which are still too long for him. As the other children play, he stands rigidly in the same spot, watching timidly.

The Syrian crisis has created an inordinate number of refugees – many of whom are children.  Amir is just one amongst 291,398 Syrian children currently living in Jordan, forced from their homes by a war which has turned a country against itself. Whilst they are certainly fortunate in having been able to leave the arena of conflict, for many children like Amir, the pressures of this war have shifted from physical to emotional.

“[Syrian refugee children] may have escaped physical harm, but for them the war zone is just one small part of this conflict.” – Katie Welsford, Emma Pearson

Of course, many Syrian children seem happy – or as happy as one could expect them to be – engaging well with teachers, working hard and maintaining grand personal ambitions – their resilience bearing testament to children’s innocently hopeful visions of the future.

But as a recent report by the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, emphasizes, many children are suffering from acute psychological distress. Just like Amir, some show distinct and visible signs of nervousness, depression and an inability to engage with others, having cordoned themselves off with invisible barriers, blocking everything and everyone out. Others show their distress through an inability to sleep, chronic bed wetting, constant crying and speech impairments. Others yet express themselves through anger and violence.

Syrian refugee children attend a class at their camp in Amman December 23, 2013. (Reuters)

Within Jordan’s refugee camps, facilities are in place to help children deal with the psychological impact of dislocated life and the haunting memories of conflict. But outside of the camps – within the host communities where the majority of Jordan’s refugees are living – there’s little provided. Psychological support for children is limited due to an acute shortage of state-run mental health care services: at present, no specialized child psychiatrists are working with refugees in Jordan, and few teachers are receiving the necessary training for working with refugee children suffering from psychological distress.

Fifty-six percent of Jordan’s child refugees meanwhile are without access to education – either due to their family’s inability to cover transport fees, or because local schools are filled to capacity. Those who do make it to the classroom, tend to go in the afternoons only – the shift system having somehow evolved separating students into two national blocs: Jordanians in the mornings and Syrians in the afternoons. It might not have been intended this way, but families have displayed a keenness for their children to mingle with their own. The cross-over hour between shifts has seen growing tensions - and in some instances violence – between Jordanian and Syrian children. Whilst NGOs have been working to combat these tensions, they are nevertheless still widespread, and for many Syrian children, school is becoming an increasingly intimidating arena.

In many cases, however, families are relying on children to serve as income generators, and child labor is reaching worryingly high levels. Many youngsters are having to work in hazardous environments for menial sums of money. For such children, their worldview has suddenly become one of an adult’s, focused upon the stress of earning the means to keep their families afloat.

A Syrian refugee boy looks at his Taekwondo instructor at Za'atari refugee camp near Mafraq, Jordan, September 17, 2013. (AP)

The activity day over, Amir and the other children run toward the door.  A few of the very youngest children have a sibling, parent or grandparent waiting for them, but most wander off alone. In this somewhat remote suburb, it is safe for them to play on the silent street which winds between the large concrete buildings. But it’s an odd spectacle, an area seemingly populated just by children. They skip in the road, sit in the entrances to buildings, gather in the stairwells, or play on the balconies or in the barren landscape between the buildings.

Few of Syria’s children have the support they need, and many are being forced, very suddenly in one way or another, to act older than they really are. Even though they have escaped the war zone, escaped the sights and sounds that they should have never been exposed to, Syria’s and their own future risk being lost in the chaos of the present.

Just like Amir, each child is negotiating his or her way through a world run by adults, but spoiled by their seemingly childish power games. And while some of the children are able to lose themselves in the dance and craft workshops of their activity days, still far too many are internalizing the isolation of their surroundings.

Children like Amir may have escaped physical harm, but for them the war zone is just one small part of this conflict. Lost in this distant refugee suburb, there is still a battle to be fought. The battle for their childhoods.

* Amir is not the boy’s real name. It has been changed to protect his identity.

This post was co-authored by Emma Pearson.

The views expressed in this Voices post are the authors’ own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you have an opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. And, if you would like to share your own reflections on events or issues about or relevant to the Middle East, we would be glad to consider them for publication. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for a Voices post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your personal blog.

Below please find a transcript of the interview. To listen to it, use the audio player below.

Yackee: Could you explain what you found, please?

Gerntholtz: Human Rights Watch has been documenting indiscriminate violations against civilians for almost the entire length of this conflict. And this particular report focuses on a set of violations that we have observed that affect women in areas that are controlled by extremists.

Liesl Gerntholtz

So, what we saw were dress restrictions; women were being forced to veil, to cover their heads, cover their faces. We saw restrictions on mobility; women were not allowed outside of their homes to buy food, to take their children to school, to seek medical care. We saw a range of restrictions that, really on top of the conflict, are having a very significant impact on women’s rights and, of course, their quality of life, such as it is.

Yackee: Is this not a reversal?

Gerntholtz: This is a reversal because, as the report says, these were not restrictions that could be applied in Syria before the conflict. So, this is definitely a roll-back of women’s rights.

Yackee: Is there anything that can be done about it?

Gerntholtz: It’s a very complex situation because certainly these areas are not under government control; they’re not under the control of the opposition such that it is. So these are areas that are really under the control of militia, and under the control of extremists. So we have made a call to them to ask them to uphold human right, to make sure women are able to exercise their human rights, including to be able to travel freely, to seek health care and medical care when they need it. But I guess we’re not particularly optimistic that this is going to change anytime soon.

Yackee: Human Rights Watch has spoken to some women who have been victims of this. Could you please share with us their stories.

Gerntholtz: For me, a particularly sad story was [about] a women who talked about her [female] neighbor who did not have a male relative – I think her husband had been killed in the fighting. And because she had no male relative to accompany her, she was unable to leave during the fighting. Her neighbor told us that the woman and her children had been killed during a bombing. We talked to women who were not able to go out to buy food and the consequences of that for their children. So, [these are] truly a range of really horrendous violations that are happening to women because of these restrictions.

Yackee: What happens to a women when she just ignores all these restrictions and just goes out and does her own thing?

Gerntholtz: We did document retaliations against women and their families if they did not comply with the regulations. We documented women who were detained; we documented some physical abuse of women, we documented victimization of women and their families if women were seen not to comply with the restrictions. So there were definitely consequences.

Listen to our interview with Liesl Gerntholtz:

Meanwhile, Sinai-based jihadists have used Morsi’s removal as a pretext for intensifying their violence, and have increasingly hit targets west of the Suez Canal. Even the Brotherhood’s fiercest opponents are fighting among themselves: the coalition of entrenched state institutions and leftist political parties that rebelled against Morsi is fraying, and the youth activists who backed Morsi’s ouster in July are now protesting against the military-backed government, which has responded by arresting their leaders.

So despite the fact that Egypt’s post-Morsi transition is technically moving forward, with a new draft constitution expected to pass via referendum in mid-January and elections to follow shortly thereafter, the country is a tinderbox that could ignite with any spark, entirely derailing the political process and converting Egypt’s episodic tumult into severe instability. What might that spark be? Here are three possibilities:

1. A high-profile political assassination. While he may be as well-guarded as any top official, Egyptian Defense Minister (and de facto ruler) Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is squarely in the Muslim Brotherhood’s crosshairs. He is, after all, the face of the coup that toppled Morsi, and he later called Egyptians to the streets to seek their “authorization” for a subsequent crackdown that killed more than 1,000 Morsi supporters.

The Brotherhood hasn’t been shy in calling for his death. Brotherhood protests frequently feature images of Sisi with a noose around his neck for “treason,” and the Brotherhood-backed Anti-Coup Alliance recently tweeted, “the people want the murderer executed,” in an apparent reference to Sisi.

Moreover, in December, a pro-Brotherhood website even reported excitedly (double exclamation points and all) that an assassination attempt against Sisi had already taken place, adding that Sisi was hastily flown to Saudi Arabia for treatment, where he refused to have his leg amputated so that he wouldn’t have to retire from the military. (This was, of course, false.) And while the Brotherhood has been implicated in political assassinations previously, such as the 1948 murder of Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi, it is hardly the only or best-equipped organization that wants Sisi dead: The Egyptian general is currently overseeing a military campaign against Sinai-based jihadists, who attempted to assassinate Egypt’s interior minister in Cairo in early September and have repeatedly attacked security installations, most recently in the Nile Delta city of Mansoura and governorate of Sharkiya.

“…Egypt’s unsettled political situation and swell of violence make the atmosphere ripe for further upheaval.” – Eric Trager, The Washington Institute

If Sisi were assassinated, it would have two effects. First, the military would likely respond with an even more severe crackdown on the Brotherhood than the one that is already underway. This is precisely what happened following a 1954 assassination attempt on Gamal Abdel Nasser that was blamed on the Brotherhood: thousands of Muslim Brothers were detained, tortured, and executed over the next two decades. Second, given the current expectation that Sisi will either run for president or act as the kingmaker, his assassination would catalyze intense competition among various security officials who would vie – directly or via proxies – for the presidency. This would further weaken Egypt’s already disjointed state, raising the prospect of even greater violence.

A supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and ousted Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi steps on a poster of Egypt's current de facto leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi during a protest in Cairo Aug. 23, 2013. (Reuters)

2. Protests and/or violence at polling stations. Egyptians are widely expected to approve the referendum of the new constitution in January – no referendum in Egyptian history has ever resulted in a “no.” But the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies reject the post-Morsi political process and are reportedly planning to thwart the plebiscite by protesting at polling stations and preventing voters from entering the booths. While one must take reports about the Brotherhood in the Egyptian press with a heavy chunk of salt, the organization’s statements in recent weeks comparing voting in the referendum to “participation in bloodshed” suggest that aggressive action is possible. And the fact that Egyptian security forces are planning for this possibility is hardly reassuring: Egypt’s notoriously brutal police would likely engage the obstructionists violently, and those areas in which Islamists are particularly strong might be able to hold off government forces for a while, as occurred in the Giza town of Kerdasa in September.

This sort of incident wouldn’t just delay the vote – it would reveal the transitional government’s weakness. This would encourage the Brotherhood to escalate its protest activities, and might also encourage the Sinai jihadists to escalate their attacks. Rather than moving quickly toward the next rounds of elections, Egypt would be headed toward persistent civil strife.

3. A major terrorist incident in the Suez Canal. In August, Sinai-based jihadists fired rockets at a Panamanian-flagged cargo ship passing through the Suez Canal. While the Egyptian military responded with a major ground offensive against the jihadists shortly thereafter and beefed up security along the canal, Egypt’s generals admit that the campaign in Sinai has proven much more difficult than they expected. Moreover, subsequent terrorist attacks against both military and civilian targets suggest that the jihadists are extremely determined and, at times, very well-armed: terrorists filmed themselves firing an RPG in Cairo in October, and an explosion outside a camp for security forces in Ismailia in December wounded 30 people.

A poster of deposed Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi lies on the ground as military police stand on Cairo's burnt Rabaa Adawiya Square, the morning after the clearing of a pro-Morsi protest camp Aug. 15, 2013. (Reuters)

A major attack on the Suez Canal would be particularly devastating. In addition to embarrassing the military-backed government internationally, it would harm the one source of domestically generated state revenue that has remained relatively stable despite the political tumult of the past three years. The current government can’t afford to lose it: Despite a $12 billion pledge from Persian Gulf states in the immediate aftermath of Morsi’s ouster, Egypt’s cash reserves have declined in recent months – dropping from $18.6 billion in October to $17.8 billion in November. Meanwhile, the government has announced plans to increase the minimum wage for government employees and preserve the costly food-subsidy program. A sharp dip in Suez Canal revenue would affect the government’s ability to meet its obligations, and ongoing cash-reserve declines could spell the return of the constant blackouts and long gas lines that plagued Morsi during his final months in office. Mass anger, and the beginnings of a possible uprising, would likely follow.

There’s a slim chance, of course, that any of these particular scenarios will occur. But Egypt’s unsettled political situation and swell of violence make the atmosphere ripe for further upheaval. Something will likely give.

This post was previously published on WashingtonInstitute.org. ©2014 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Reprinted with permission.

The views expressed in this Insight are the author’s own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you’d like to share your opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. If you are a Middle East expert or analyst associated with an established academic institution, think tank or non-governmental organization, we invite you to contribute your perspectives on events and issues about or relevant to the region. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for an Insight post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your institutional blog.

In Geneva on November 24, Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – plus Germany agreed to a Joint Plan of Action. For good reason, the world welcomed this initial agreement because it squarely put Iran and the powers on a road to end the crisis through diplomacy.

The deal calls for Tehran and the powers to negotiate the “final step” of a two-stage agreement inside six months. In the best case, the two sides will with determination quickly negotiate that final step. Iran will demonstrate to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that its nuclear program is wholly dedicated to peaceful uses and agree to verified limits on its sensitive nuclear activities for a considerable period of time. In exchange, sanctions against Iran will be lifted.

An effective final deal could emerge. But Iran and the West will continue to have major differences whether or not there is a final nuclear pact. Residual mutual suspicion is significant, and the United States and Iran have competing hardwired security commitments in the region. The United States will not pivot away from Israel and the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, and Iran will not abandon the Alawites in Syria and push Hezbollah to renounce force. The November deal will not lead to a transformation of the West’s relations with Iran, and the act of signing a deal will not mean Washington and Tehran have somehow overcome their multiple fundamental differences and become partners, as some observers either hope or fear.

The clock is ticking

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry knew what he was talking about when he announced in Geneva that the initial step of the Iran nuclear deal had been agreed to and warned that “now the really hard part begins.” The Joint Plan of Action says that Iran and the powers “aim to conclude” the final agreement in “no more than one year.” But the issues that remain to be resolved and the amount of work that needs to be done could delay agreement on the final step for many months.

“…[N]egotiators understand that Iran will not accept a total halt to enrichment, whatever the cost.” – Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Endowment

The main problem is not that Iran will refuse to implement what it agreed to in the initial deal. It will almost certainly stop producing and installing more uranium-enrichment centrifuges, limit that enrichment to no more than 5 percent U-235 (enriching to higher levels would bring Iran closer to weapons-grade material), and convert its enriched uranium gas inventory to less-threatening oxide. It is also likely to halt essential work on the Arak heavy-water reactor project, where Iran is developing the capability to produce plutonium, which can be used for making nuclear weapons.

Tehran has every incentive to comply with these measures. Were it to cheat, Iran’s adversaries, convinced that Iran cannot be trusted, would be vindicated and would gain leverage to add sanctions or use force. Iran knows this.

Instead, the potential showstoppers looming before the parties concern matters that the negotiation of the final step itself must resolve. Crucially, the Joint Plan of Action left open how Iran, the powers, and the IAEA would resolve two critical matters: unanswered questions about sensitive and potentially embarrassing past and possibly recent Iranian nuclear activities, and unfulfilled demands by the U.N. Security Council that Iran suspend its uranium-enrichment program. Since 2006, Tehran has refused to comply with the Security Council’s suspension orders, and since 2008, it has refused to address allegations leveled by the IAEA that point to nuclear weapons research and development by Iran.

A portion of Iran's Arak heavy water nuclear facilities is seen near the central city of Arak. (AP/FARS file)

The Joint Plan of Action is deliberately vague about how to handle these issues, not because Western diplomats were naive but in part because the powers intended the initial deal to build confidence. That means that groundbreaking and deal-making were paramount, inviting bold statements, not nitty-gritty outlines. Also leading to this outcome is the fact that when the United States revved up the negotiation this fall in direct bilateral talks with Iran, what was originally a four-step road map became a two-step process featuring an initial step and a final step, with the fine print of steps two and three in the original scheme left to be worked out.

If the parties do not work out the two major challenges they face, the negotiation may fail. If differences result in a stalemate, Iran’s hardliners could gain the upper hand, continue pursuing unfettered nuclear development, and eventually terminate the initial accord. Alternatively, U.S. lawmakers could respond to a lack of progress by adding to Iran’s sanctions burden, which would likewise doom the negotiation. There is much at stake.

Answering questions about nuclear activities

During the negotiation of the final step, the IAEA could be the elephant in the room. The IAEA is not a party to the initial step, but it remains closely involved with Iran’s nuclear program. Since 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors and the U.N. Security Council have urged the agency to resolve outstanding allegations that Iran has worked on developing nuclear weapons, an issue referred to in IAEA reports as the “possible military dimension” (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program.

Formally and legally, the IAEA track and the six powers’ political track are separate. The powers are supposed to negotiate with Iran a political solution to the crisis. The IAEA, on the basis of its verification mandate, independently seeks answers about whether Iran is in compliance with its bilateral agreement on nuclear safeguards. The forthcoming negotiation over the final step will have to reconcile these two imperatives.

Since 2008, Iran has balked at answering the IAEA’s questions about PMD. On November 11, Iran and the IAEA issued a Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation in an effort to overcome this impasse. The statement says that both sides will “strengthen cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program through the resolution of all outstanding issues” but neither it nor the November 24 Joint Plan of Action spells out when or to what extent Iran must comply with the IAEA’s request for information concerning activities related to nuclear weapons development. It is possible that Iran may strictly implement the suspension terms in the Joint Plan of Action but not cooperate to the extent the IAEA deems necessary on PMD. In that case, if the powers conclude that lack of cooperation between the IAEA and Iran stands in the way of a final agreement, they might pressure the IAEA to relent on its requirements in the interest of making a deal.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (R) chats with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the United Nations Palais in Geneva November 24, 2013. (Reuters)

Tensions between the IAEA and the Western powers might then arise since until this point all have agreed that the IAEA should remain steadfast in seeking Iran’s answers to its questions, including about activities not directly involved in the production or processing of nuclear materials. Moreover, the logic of the negotiation between Iran and the powers implies that the IAEA must have a robust verification mandate, permitting it to eventually conclude, perhaps in a few years, that Iran’s nuclear program is transparent and without clandestine activities. The Joint Plan of Action says what the endgame is: “The Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].” But to get there, the IAEA has to express its confidence. And to obtain that, the PMD issue requires closure.

One possible contribution to resolving this impasse would be for the powers to negotiate an agreement with a verification component committing Iran not to do specific things related to the development of nuclear explosives and delivery systems. A forward-looking commitment like this could maintain diplomatic momentum while building Iranian confidence that the answers Tehran provides regarding past activities will not be used to punish it.

But if expediency prompts negotiators to ignore important unresolved issues about Iran’s capabilities, the IAEA’s credibility will be damaged, and a final agreement with Iran may not survive attacks from critics claiming thereafter the deal has dangerous loopholes. Moreover, the stated goal of the IAEA-Iran Framework for Cooperation is to “ensur[e] the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.” It is difficult to see how this could be done unless Iran tells the truth about its most sensitive nuclear history.

Security council demands

Since 2006, the Security Council has ordered Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Until recently, the powers agreed that a comprehensive solution requires Iran to suspend these programs, but they didn’t agree on the length of the suspension. In an interview in early 2011, one negotiator from a Western state put it this way: “The Russians propose suspending enrichment for forty-five minutes, and we want it suspended for one hundred years.” Russia proposed a road map that would have required Iran to suspend enrichment for three months. That compromise found no takers.

The Security Council’s orders to suspend enrichment were meant to halt Iran’s progress toward the point where it could “break out” of its international obligations and make a nuclear weapon in a hurry. But Iran for seven years refused to cease enrichment, and so its “breakout” timeline has continued to shrink. The Joint Plan of Action shows that negotiators understand that Iran will not accept a total halt to enrichment, whatever the cost. Thus the final step will include a provision permitting Iran to enrich uranium “with agreed limits.” Negotiators might even be willing to override Security Council suspension resolutions with a new resolution that does not require suspension – provided that Iran builds confidence by agreeing to and quickly implementing other steps. For example, Tehran could decide not to build a heavy-water reactor at Arak, reduce its number of centrifuges, and ratify and implement the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.

The Joint Plan of Action refers to “additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including . . . addressing the U.N. Security Council resolutions.” Since these resolutions imposed sanctions on Iran as well as obligations, Tehran and the powers must carefully calibrate the sequence in which sanctions would be lifted with steps taken by Iran to reduce its nuclear threat.

This post was originally published on CarnegieEndowment.org.

The views expressed in this Insight are the author’s own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you’d like to share your opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. If you are a Middle East expert or analyst associated with an established academic institution, think tank or non-governmental organization, we invite you to contribute your perspectives on events and issues about or relevant to the region. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for an Insight post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your institutional blog.

Of six Arab countries that have experienced revolts since late 2010, only tiny Tunisia and Yemen appear to be making fitful progress toward political pluralism. Libya is plagued by tribal and religious militia violence, Bahrain has suppressed its Shi’ite Muslim majority and Egypt has reverted to military dictatorship. Syria is the ultimate nightmare – a multifaceted civil war that is metastasizing into neighboring Iraq and Lebanon, where terrorism and sectarianism is on the rise.

Even non-Arab Turkey, a NATO member and more established democracy that portrayed itself as a model for the changing Arab world, is reeling from popular protests, allegations of high-level corruption and infighting between rival Islamist-influenced groups.

While Syria presents the greatest immediate danger to regional stability because of its refugee outflow and jihadist allure, Egypt – the most populous and influential Arab state – is in some ways, the most worrisome.

It is painful to remember the euphoria in Cairo’s Tahrir Square three years ago when a wide spectrum of Egyptians gathered to demand the end of decades of authoritarian rule by president Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak finally agreed to step down under a process managed by the military that led to the first free parliamentary and presidential elections in Egyptian history. But secular democratic forces long marginalized by Mubarak were unable to unite and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi eked out a slim victory in run-off elections for president in 2012.

“[Egypt's] future looks grim unless a way can be found to reintegrate Brotherhood followers into the political process and to isolate a hardline minority.” – Barbara Slavin

Morsi failed spectacularly to govern Egypt in an inclusive manner. However, the “coup-volution” that removed him last summer has also failed to restore social peace or prosperity. The military-backed transitional government now ruling the country has killed hundreds and arrested thousands in a sweeping crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. Last week, the government declared the venerable organization, founded in 1928, a “terrorist group” in an extreme but pyrrhic attempt to expunge the brotherhood’s deep roots in Egyptian society.

FILE - Torn posters of ousted Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi are seen on a wall at Cairo's Tahrir Square Sept. 26, 2013. (Reuters)

While elections are scheduled in 2014 on a new, nominally democratic constitution, president and parliament, the exclusion of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the continued weakness of secular parties mean that the Egyptian “deep state” – led by army chief and likely next president Gen. Abdul Fattah al-Sissi  – will continue to dominate the country.  A wave of arrests has forced Brotherhood followers underground to seethe quietly or join violent splinter groups. Terrorist bombings and assassinations are becoming all too common, spooking potential tourists and further depressing the economy and job creation. Ordinary Egyptians who have come to rely on the Brotherhood’s network of social services are also suffering. Egypt may muddle through for a while with the financial support of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but its future looks grim unless a way can be found to reintegrate Brotherhood followers into the political process and to isolate a hardline minority.

Marwan Muasher, a former Jordanian foreign minister and ambassador to the United States who is now vice president of the Carnegie Endowment, describes the upheaval that began in late 2010 in Tunisia as “the second Arab Awakening.” The first, Muasher notes in a new book by that title, started a century ago when Arab intellectuals questioned the control of their territories by the Ottoman Empire and sought independence from foreign rule. That movement failed to produce representative government as native autocrats replaced colonial ones. While it is too soon to conclude that this second wave will also fail, Muasher writes that success depends on the willingness of new governments to tolerate opposing political, religious and ethnic groups.

“Only when societies and their elected leaders truly embrace tolerance, diversity, the peaceful rotation of power and inclusive economic growth can the promise of a new Arab world be realized,” Muasher says.

Muasher writes that it will likely be decades before it is possible to judge whether the second Arab Awakening transformed the region in a positive direction or was just a blip between autocracies. Real change requires major reforms in the way Arab societies educate young people, Muasher says, instilling creative thinking in place of rote memorization and blind obedience to those in power. So far, however, those capable of independent thought too often wind up emigrating or behind bars. The recent dragnet that incarcerated the Brotherhood leadership is also scooping up young secular activists such as Ahmad Maher, co-founder of the April 6 movement that helped organize the 2011 revolt against Mubarak through social media.

Like Mubarak, the military regime now in control of Egypt appears determined to make sure that Egyptians are faced with a choice between an authoritarian status quo and chaos – i.e., no choice. The United States cannot force Egypt’s rulers to embrace political pluralism but U.S. officials should not pretend they are happy about the way things are turning out in such a pivotal nation.

The views expressed in this Insight are the author’s own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you’d like to share your opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. If you are a Middle East expert or analyst associated with an established academic institution, think tank or non-governmental organization, we invite you to contribute your perspectives on events and issues about or relevant to the region. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for an Insight post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your institutional blog.

Since the military overthrow of president Mohamed Morsi, the only democratically elected leader in Egyptian history, security forces have launched a campaign of persecution against the Muslim Brotherhood, with mass killings of protesters, dragnet arrests of its supporters and, most recently, the designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

Officials have said they would establish a fact-finding commission to investigate the August 14 massacre of more than 1,000 protesters at the Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque and two incidents in July in which security forces killed scores of protesters after Morsi’s overthrow. But no commission has been formed. Human Rights Watch investigations into these killings concluded that government forces used excessive lethal force to disperse the protests, indiscriminately firing at protesters.

Egypt’s track record on accountability for the slayings of protesters since the revolution has been dismal. Even investigations into the deaths of protesters at the hands of Mubarak’s forces, at a time when accountability was a national rallying cry, resulted in only slap-on-the-wrist sentences for a few low-level police officers. There has been no comprehensive public accounting of the killings under the military authorities. With little popular pressure demanding justice for pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters killed this year, it’s hard to imagine that the government has any serious intention of punishing security officers, much less senior officials.

“Egypt’s test today is… to show that Egyptians stand against the abuse of any of their fellow citizens, even their political opponents.” – Sarah Leah Whitson, Human Rights Watch

In its campaign to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to heel, the authorities have arrested thousands of rank-and-file Brotherhood supporters on a laundry list of charges. In a startling example of selective prosecution, the authorities are charging Morsi and other senior Brotherhood officials with inciting torture and murder at an anti-Morsi protest last year at which 11 protesters died, but they have made no arrests of anyone charged with these killings.

A poster of deposed Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi lies on the ground as military police stand on Cairo's burnt Rabaa al-Adawiya Square, the morning after the clearing of a pro-Morsi protest camp August 15, 2013. (Reuters)

The military authorities have brazenly “disappeared” five key Morsi advisors, detaining them in secret places without charge for more than five months, though the government charged and transferred them to Tora prison earlier this month. Few voices besides Brotherhood partisans are demanding, at minimum, due process for the detainees.

And in November, a court convicted 21 women and girls for participating in pro-Morsi protests, with the women sentenced to 11 years in prison and the girls to detention until they’re 18. An appeals court reduced the sentence, but the chilling message to protesters remains. Challenges by human rights organizations to government abuses are met with scorn.

Brotherhood officials and family members whom Human Rights Watch has met with in Cairo have focused not on politics or strategy but on a desperate appeal for the well-being and survival of their colleagues and loved ones. Relatives lucky enough to have prison visits tell of the appalling conditions the detainees face.

Many senior Brotherhood figures are held in solitary confinement, and report that they are sleeping on the floor in dank cells and are forced to defecate in holes in their cells. They say that food, water and electricity are extremely limited, and they’re unable to get needed medicines. Prosecutors have renewed pretrial detentions en masse, with no real opportunity to challenge the detentions.

Women detained at a pro-Islamist protest stand in a holding cell at a court hearing in the coastal city of Alexandria December 7, 2013. (Reuters)

In this context, it’s startling to hear Secretary of State John F. Kerry lauding Egypt’s new rulers for “restoring democracy” while charging the Brotherhood with “stealing the revolution.” Such shameless cajoling does nothing to rein in the military’s heavy-handed abuses, much less move Egypt in a democratic direction. As President Obama has said, it’s hard to have a political dialogue when the opposition is in jail.

A Palestinian friend described the situation in Egypt today as proof that Egyptians “aren’t opposed to oppression; they’re OK with it as long as they’re not the ones being oppressed.” Egypt’s test today is to prove him wrong, and show that Egyptians stand against the abuse of any of their fellow citizens, even their political opponents.

A version of this post was originally published by the Los Angeles Times.

The views expressed in this Insight are the author’s own and are not endorsed by Middle East Voices or Voice of America. If you’d like to share your opinion on this post, you may use our democratic commenting system below. If you are a Middle East expert or analyst associated with an established academic institution, think tank or non-governmental organization, we invite you to contribute your perspectives on events and issues about or relevant to the region. Please email us through our Contact page with a short proposal for an Insight post or send us a link to an existing post already published on your institutional blog.