Zugzwang (pronounced tsoog-tzvung), a German term, literally means “forced to move.” In chess jargon it describes a situation in which any move a player can possibly make will significantly weaken his or her position.
Applied to Egyptian politics, that is exactly the situation the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) finds itself in today having made some irretractable moves. It’s not the first time in its eighty odd year history that the MB has zugzwanged itself, but the most recent is probably the most injurious of cases.
It revolves around Egypt’s upcoming presidential elections.
Between their politically astute assertion that they will not field a candidate of their own, their dubious declaration that they will not support an Islamic candidate, and their widely anticipated assertion that they will not support a secular candidate, the MB has climbed up a long, steep ladder and seems stuck there. So much so that one usually unsympathetic observer who just talked to a ranking MB member emerged from the meeting shaking his head as he proclaimed, “They are in a very serious fix, a dilemma of the worst type.”
Over a year ago, the MB announced that it will not field a candidate for the presidency from within its own ranks. It illustrated its resolve when it ousted from its ranks long-time insider and senior member of the MB Dr. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh as soon as he announced his candidacy for president.
Now, despite increasingly loud calls from younger members of the MB to allow support for Aboul Fotouh, the MB appears to be taking steps towards an about-face. It began testing the waters by leaking the prospective candidacy of MB bigwig and chief financier Khayrat El Shater. This, despite the fact that they continue to formally claim that they have not yet decided whether or not to put forward a candidate of their own.
In further defiance of the demands of many of its rank-and-file members, and certainly the majority of its non-member loyalists, the Brotherhood also announced that it does not wish to see an Islamist president come to power after elections in May, thus all but ruling out hopefuls like Hazem Abu Ismail and Mohamed Selim El Awa, both of whom are strongly perceived as Islamist candidates.
More in line with supporter expectations, the MB leadership has ruled out supporting a secular or secular leaning candidate, eliminating possible support for the likes of Hamdeen Sabahy, Ayman Nour and Bothaina Kamel.

Supporters carry posters of Egyptian presidential candidate and former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Dr. Abdel Moneim Abu El Fotouh in Cairo March 29, 2012 (Reuters photo).
Taking one more step toward the fateful end of the ladder, the MB, in one fell swoop, then ruled out endorsing the candidacies of ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Amr Moussa, ex-Prime-Minister, ex-Minister of Civil Aviation and ex-Commander of the Air Force Ahmed Shafik and the most recently announced contestant, ex-head spook and short-term Vice President Omar Suleiman. They did so declaring they would not support any candidate closely associated with the old regime.
The only serious power brokers in Cairo (if you ignore the Egyptian people) are the army represented by the currently ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the MB. Their preferences, whether in collaboration or competition with each other, will have a large impact on who will next occupy Egypt’s presidential palace.
Prevailing conventional wisdom seems to point to the SCAF supporting Suleiman or Shafik (or, as the joke goes, both). Half the kingmaker’s story is thus told. The second half rests squarely with the MB and its decision on who will receive its generous, well-organized and possibly seminal, support.
But Zugzwang remains Zugzwang for the MB. All options weaken their position in one way or more.
A 180-degree reversal towards fielding an MB candidate (e.g. El Shater) or another Islamist risks not only creating dissent among followers who might support Aboul Fotouh, but would also reinforce the already widespread perception of the MB as a group that changes its positions with the wind and has no principled stance on anything political.
On the other hand, pushing for a secular president under the supposed guise of wanting to create balance between a heavily Islamist parliament and the presidency would alienate many members but, more dangerously, would rock the foundation of the MB’s real powerbase, the millions of non-member loyalists who in the last election essentially secured for them control over 47% of the parliament and who basically view them as a moderate alternative to hardcore Salafis.
While pledging support for an ex-regime man may please the SCAF and cuddle the MB into the graces of Egypt’s increasingly numerous and vocal anti-revolutionaries, it would buttress an age-old accusation leveled against the MB that they are spineless and eager to collude with whoever is in power.
So, what’s the best possible option in chess when zugzwanged? The obvious answer, even though the rules of the game forbid it, is: Do nothing.
And since the MB is not actually ensnarled in a chess game, they can do just that and prove themselves to be political grandmasters.
But will they have the level-headedness, open-mindedness and courage to come out and openly support none of the candidates vying for the presidency?
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Hatem Rushdy
Hatem Rushdy is an Egyptian blogger and editor of the non-fiction first person accounts compilation 18 Days in Tahrir: Stories from Egypt's Revolution. He owns and runs People Plus, an Executive Search and HR Consulting firm.
Ahmeddeif
March 31, 2012
I can add that they should Do nothing “formally and publicly” and internally side with Abu El Fottouh.
Ahmeddeif
March 31, 2012
I can add that they should Do nothing “formally and publicly” and internally side with Abu El Fottouh.
Walidrashwan
March 31, 2012
I agree mostly. I however feel that SCAF are the ones controlling the chess board with MB being used to eliminate their initial foe, the revelotionaries! Now they will go short of NOTHING to acheive a favorable president and constitution. Favorable that is to their own interests rather than the country’s necessarily.
Walidrashwan
March 31, 2012
I agree mostly. I however feel that SCAF are the ones controlling the chess board with MB being used to eliminate their initial foe, the revelotionaries! Now they will go short of NOTHING to acheive a favorable president and constitution. Favorable that is to their own interests rather than the country’s necessarily.
الريان Ryan ريان
March 31, 2012
An Excellent analysis. Very cogent and well written. Very useful to an outsider’s inquiry into the bizarre specter of Egyptians grapple with democracy for the first time since ousting the monarchy in the early fifties of the 20th century. Highly recommended read.
الريان Ryan ريان
March 31, 2012
An Excellent analysis. Very cogent and well written. Very useful to an outsider’s inquiry into the bizarre specter of Egyptians grapple with democracy for the first time since ousting the monarchy in the early fifties of the 20th century. Highly recommended read.